In the last thirty years, one of the most influential papers in the field of philosophy of perception was Karl Jaakko Hintikka's paper: »On the Logie of perception«, presented al the Oberlin Colloqiunt in 1967. In that paper, Hintikka tried to show that the logic of perception should be considered as a subclass of epistemic (or doxastic) logic and, subsequently, as a branch of modal logic. His intention was not only to present the formal semantics for perceptual concepts, but to show that, by treating perceptual concepts as modal notions, we can set up new horizons for solving some of the classical issues in the philosophy of perception. This basic idea, Hintikka has developed through several, also rather important, papers, such as: »Information, Causality and the Logic of Perception«, »Intentions of Intent iona lily«, etc. In this paper, I will shortly explicate Hintikka's point of view and try to point out some ontological problems connected with causality, which are implicit in his approach to the problem of perception.
The most important feature of Hintikka's approach is, by all means, the possible worlds semantics (»possible world«, for Hintikka, stands for a possible state of affairs or a possible course of events). In his semantics »a sees that p« =that, in all possible worlds compatible with what a perceives, it is the case that p. But, if we want to know is »p« really the case in all relevant worlds (relevant worlds are, of course, those compatible with what »a« perceives) there must be a possibility of its identification through possible worlds. Such a method o f identification, which tells us if some member of one o f the possible worlds represents the same individual as a member o f another possible world, H intikka calls the method o f cross-identification, because it refers to identification across the boundaries o f possible worlds. When perception is considered, only if the cross identification is possible, then it is possible to talk about individuation, since the method o f cross-identification enables us to determine the identity o f the references o f a singular term that specifics a unique individual in the different possible worlds. In short, when perception is considered, the method o f cross-identification and the method o f individuation are synonyms.
We shall say that a singular term specifies a unique individual, viz. that the individual is well-defined, if and only if the references o f that singular term on »the manifestations« o f the individual in the different possible worlds are connected with one and the same individuating function (or »world line«, which is the alternative term for the individuating function). The individuating function is a function which picks out the manifestations o f the individual in all relevant possible worls (or roles which that individual plays in a certain course o f events). Since every manifestation o f the individual, in relevant possible worlds, has certain properties and stands in certain rlalions with the manifestations o f the other individuals, either the continuity or the sim ilarity o f these properties and relations, enables us to trace the world line o f the relevant individual in space and time (when veridical perception is considered, H intikka introduces a special criterion o f cross-identification -causality).
The greatest syntactical novelty of H in likka 's logic o f perception is manifested in the use o f two sets o f quantifiers. This syntactical novelty is the consequence o f H in lik k a 's semantical views on the nature o f perception. According to his view, there are two methods o f cross-identi fication which arc relevant for perception -physical (or descriptive) and perceptual. When we perceive, we conceptualize the reality in two different ways. One way, or one method o f cross-identification, refers to situations when we perceive someone (or something), but we can not say who (or what) the object o f our perception is. Since we, nevertheless, can perceptually identify that individual (determining its location in our perceptual space), this approach represents one method o f cross-identification. The other method o f cross-identification refers to situations when we know who (or what) the object o f perception is.
The perceptual relation o f a perceiver and a perceived object is crucial for the perceptual method o f cross-identification. It means (hat this method depends on subjective experience, which implies the fact that drugs or coloured glasses can influence our ontological altitudes. The quantifiers relying on the perceptual method o f cross-identification are ( 3 x ) and ( Vx).
The formalized expression »a perceives Mr. Smith«, in H in tik k a 's logic o f perception, would be: ( 3x) (a perceives that (b=x)), where b = M r. Smith.
The physical method of cross-identification relics on facts such as the continuity o f the behaviour of the material bodies in space and time, sim ilarity o f individuals, continuity o f memory and so forth. To be able io determine who (or what) the perceived object is, means to be able to say that the perceived object (the individual) is physically well-defined. Quantifiers relying on physical methods o f cross-identification are (Ex) and ( H intikka rejects the classical approach to the problem o f perception, since that approach im plicitly presupposes a two-term relation between the perceiver and the perceived object. H intikka's alternative approach is inspired by possible worlds semantics. For him, perceptual concepts should be treated as modal notions, which implies that they involve simultaneous m ultiple reference to more than one possible world, and which, in turn, implies that the perception should not be treated as a simple two-term relation. This is, also, the reason why the well known argument from illusion (1), and its undesired consequence -postulation o f ontologically problematic entities (sense data) should be rejected.
According to H in tikka 's view, there is no ontological difference between the individuttls in the actual and in the possible worlds. The difference is neither in the ontological status of individuals referred to by singular terms, nor in the kind o f reference o f those singular terms. The difference is based exclusively on the difference o f the methods of individuation, syntactically expressed in the use o f two different pairs of quantifiers. Notice that variables bound to these quantifiers range over the same kind o f individuals -there is no distinction between physical and perceptual objects. The main reason for the misleading postulation of sense data is the proscribed reification o f the values o f variables bound to quantifiers relying on perceptual methods of individuation.
If we accept Quine's criterion of ontological commitment -if we quantify over something, it is necessarily a part o f ontology (»to be is to be value o f variable«), and if we accept the objcclual interpretation of quantifiers, the question is: What is it that wc quantify over? Hintikka's answer is that we prima facie quantify over world lines (or individuating functions). Prima facie, because there is no assumed contrast between the individuals of the actual world and the individuating functions. According to Hintikka, they arc »merely two sides of the same coin« (2), which means that the question concerning the ontological primacy of the idividuals of the actual world and the individuating functions is illegitimate.
The idea of the worldbound individuals is, for Hintikka, a metaphysical myth, since the individuating function represents the necessary condition for speaking of an individual of more than one world. In other words, without the individuating functions there is no way to establish the connections which create the individual of the actual world. Since individuating functions do not represent inhabitants of any possible or the actual world, it is completely misleading to talk about their ontological status. Individuating functions, in fact, represent »an objectively given supply of ways in which we can deal with more than one contingency (possible world). They are part of our conceptual repertoire or our ideology (in something like Quine's sense), rather than part of our ontology. In a sense, we are committed to their existence, in the sense of their objectivity, but not to including them among 'what there is' in the actual world or in any other world« (3).
From the ideas presented above, it follows that we should reject the intuitive idea of the individual as something independent of our conceptual apparatus. So, Hintikka rejects the position of the metaphysical realist, calling his position -conceptual realism, Connecting his position with the work of the psychologist J.J. Gibson, Hintikka treats perception as the pickup of information about the environment, rather than a mere registration of sensations. The information given by perception, since it refers to the ennvironment, must be expressed in terms of the same concepts that we use when wc talk about the objects of perception. Such information can t?e true (in the case of veridical perception) or false (in the case of nonveridical perception), but not certain or uncertain, since it can not refer to unedited sense impressions (eg. sense data).
Colours, for example, are always seen as colours of certain (three-dimensional) objects, never as colours only (4), as colours should be according to sense datum theories, for example, Russel's or Moore's. This means that secondary qualities (colours, sounds, etc.) can not exist independently of material bodies or, more precisely, the objects of three-dimensional space, viz. that such properties do not represent separate entities existing in, for example, two-dimensional space as they were treated by sense datum theoreticians. If we accept this, we should accept the basic assumption of conceptual realism according to which the content of perception should be specified in the language appropriate to properties, relations and objects of three-dimensional space, rather than in the language appropriate to sense data.
But let us return to the concept of individual. The following question still remains an open one: How can individuating functions, beside possible worlds, also reach the actual world, or: How can we say that some »perceptual objects« are identical with the objects in the actual world?
According to Hinlikka, individuating functions can reach the actual world only through a causal chain. This is the reason why he had to introduce a new distinction -between geometrical and causal methods of cross-identification: »If I am right, cross-identification between the actual world and its perceptual alternatives lakes place in a way different from cross-identification between these alternatives themselves« (5). He calls the first type of cross-identification, which should be applied in the cases of veridical perception, the causal method of cross-identification, and the second type, which should be applied in the cases od nonveridical perception, the geometrical method of cross-identification. Hintikka chose the term geometrical, since he considers it as fixing the co-ordinates of some individual in the perceptual space of a person who perceives that individual. On the other hand, the idea of causality enables his semantics to incorporate the most relevant situations, those in which we have to consider the individuals from the actual world. Those individuals, in the veridical perception, should be matched one-to-one with the individuals in the perceiver's perceptual space, according to the thesis about the ontological sameness of perceived objects. In short, for the geometrical method of cross-identification it is relevant that it is tied exclusively to the perceiver's perceptual space, and for the causal method of cross-identification it is relevant that it necessarily extends its domain to the actual world.
Since Hintikka does not explicitly define the nature of the proposed causal relation (except stating the necessary condition for establishing the lines of perceptual cross-identification -the causal chain must pass through the perceiver's sense organs), there is still a possibility of several interpretations. In fact, there are three relevant answers, compatible with Hintikka's logic of perception, to the question concerning the ontological status of the relata of the causal relation: 1) causes are entities (or events) from the actual world; effects are in the domain of possible worlds. Hintikka, or, it is better to say, anyone, would hardly accept this altitude, because it presupposes the ontologically peculiar fact that the causal effect can be transferred from the actual to possible worlds. In that case, it would be possible that sound, heat, light, etc. can, partly or completely, pass from the actual to the possible world(s), which is, I think absurd.
2) causes and effects arc entities (or events) exclusively from the possible worlds. The only accessible reality would be, obviously, ihe reality o f possible worlds, and one of those possible worlds would be defined as »the actual world«. Bui, we should si ill be forced io accept ihe strange doctrine about the causal inlcraclion between two (or more), in this case possible, worlds. Besides this, one can wonder if it is suitable for conceptual realist to rely on causality in explaining perception. If we accept H in tikka 's stance o f perceptual realist, according to which the content of perception should be specified in terms o f the concepts expressing properties and relations o f the objects of three-dimensional space, and if we accept the altitude that the causal method of cross-identification considers only individuals from possible wot Ids (including the one which is defined as »the actual world«), then it seems that the change expected as an effect o f causal relation, between »the actual world« and the corresponding possible worlds, remains obscure. Wouldn't the idea about the conceptual (and not about the causal) nature of that relation be more appropriate for a conceptual realist?
3) causes and effects are entities (or events) exclusively from the actual world. In that case, causality occurs inside the actual world, and the relation between a caused entity (or event) from the actual w orld and possible worlds, would be o f modal nature. This position is obviously the most plausible. But such a position is not incompatible w ith a position o f a more subtle sense datum theoretician who would be expressed in terms o f the concepts o f properties and relations of objects from three-dimensional space. Such a theoretician would be able to preserve the two-term relation, between the causes and effects o f perception, which means that modality, viz. »simultaneous m ultiple reference«, could appear only at the level o f relation between, for example, sense datum as the product of perceptual causal relation, and possible worlds. O f course, if he wants to allow the possibility o f relying on the modal nature of such a relation, our hypothetical sense datum theoretician should rejecL the thesis about the incorrigible access to sense data. But H intikka must not allow the com patibility o f this position and his position, since, according to sense datum theory, it is possible to reify the values o f variables bound to quantifiers relying on perceptual methods o f individuation in the form o f sense data -mental entities which Hintikka intended to eliminate.
As a conclusion, we may say that H intikka's logic o f perception, which treats perceptual concepts as modal notions, is very successful in its semantical function, but the possible worlds semantics, w ith its ontological indeterminalcncss, can not offer us significant solutions fo r classical ontological issues in the philosophy or perception. 
